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There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the "nuisance." It has meant all things to all1
men ....
The term "nuisance" has been called "a sort of legal garbage
can."2 Included within this garbage can is that which is known as a
"public nuisance." Although often viewed as an arcane subject, the
law of public nuisance has experienced a resurgence recently, particu-
larly in the area of environmental law. Today most claims for money
damages for pollution brought under state common laws include a
claim for public nuisance. The attempt is being made to apply the law
of public nuisance in the environmental area because of perceived
benefits that apply to claims for public nuisance such as statute of lim-
itations and measure of damages. To understand how the rules and
principles of public nuisance should be properly applied to new areas
such as environmental law, one must first understand the history and
purpose of the law of public nuisance. What follows is a review of this
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1. W ILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TH= LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971).
2. J.B. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 35.01, at 191 (Rev. ed. 1990)
(quoting William L. Prosser, Nuisances Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 410 (1942)).
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thing called public nuisance, particularly as it is known in Oklahoma,
and an attempt to penetrate a segment of this jungle.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
What is now known as the law of "public nuisance" began its de-
velopment in England as early as the thirteenth century.' The earliest
cases of public nuisance involved purprestures, which were encroach-
ments upon the royal domain or public highways.4 Such an encroach-
ment was an infringement upon the rights of the crown or the general
public and, as such, constituted a crime.5 As a crime, a public nui-
sance was redressed by suits by the crown.6 Over time, the term pub-
lic nuisance came to include such things as lotteries, unlicensed plays,
common scolds and "a host of other rag ends of the law."'7 The term
continued to expand until it finally came to include any "act not war-
ranted by law, or omission to discharge a legal duty, which inconve-
niences the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her
Majesty's subjects."8
It was not until the sixteenth century that the crime of public nui-
sance, for the first time, also became the tort of public nuisance.9 In
an anonymous case in 1536, it was first held that a public nuisance can
also give rise to a private tort claim if the plaintiff can show that, as a
result of the public nuisance, he sustained injuries different in kind
from those suffered by the public in general. 10 It is in this restricted
manner that the private claim for public nuisance has endured to this
date. At the time of its creation, the "tort" of public nuisance was a
significant departure from the general rule that the courts would not
3. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 572 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. "There was enough of a superficial resemblance between the blocking of a private
right of way [a private nuisance] and the blocking of a public highway to keep men contented
with calling the latter a nuisance as well; and thus was born the public nuisance." Id. (quoting
F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAW Q. REv. 480, 482 (1949)).
7. lt
8. Id (quoting STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105
(1890)).
9. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at
646 & n.37 (5th ed. 1984) (citing the anonymous case of Y. B. 27 Hen. 8, Mich., pl. 10 (1536)).
10. Id
This qualification has persisted, and it is uniformly held that a private individual has no
action for the invasion of the purely public right, unless his damage is in some way to be
distinguished from that sustained by other members of the general public. It is not
enough that he suffers the same inconvenience or is exposed to the same threatened
injury as everyone else.
[Vol. 30:355
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impose tort liability upon a person for the violation of a criminal law
that was intended to protect the public at large." The tort of public
nuisance is only one of two early common law instances in which a
criminal violation became a tort per se.
12
III. WHAT IS A "PUBLIC" NuIsANcE 9?
Any discussion of a public nuisance must include a description of
the object which the word "public" modifies: the word "nuisance." In
Oklahoma, a nuisance is defined by statute.' 3 In describing a nui-
sance, it has been said:
[T]he term "nuisance" signifies in law such a use of property or such
a course of conduct, irrespective of actual trespass against others, or
of malicious or actual criminal intent, which transgresses the just
restrictions upon use or conduct which the proximity of other per-
sons or property in civilized communities imposes upon what would
otherwise be rightful freedom. It is a class of wrongs which arises
from an unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use by a person of
his own property, working an obstruction or injury to the right of
another, or to the public, and producing such material annoyance,
inconvenience, and discomfort that the law will presume a resulting
damage.14
Thus, under Oklahoma law, the nuisance is the "act" or "failure to
act" which causes damage. 15 For example, land damage may result
from the act or failure to act, but the land damage is not the nuisance.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Defendant might
abate its nuisance, but could not, by so doing, restore Plaintiff's
,"16premises.
In most jurisdictions in the United States, a public nuisance is a
nuisance or wrong affecting an interest "common to the general pub-
lic, rather than to one peculiar individual or several."'1 7 In these
states, infringement upon a public right, even if the infringement liter-
ally affects only one or a few people, constitutes a public nuisance.
In the majority of jurisdictions, conduct does not become a public
nuisance merely because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1977).
12. Id. The other is libel.
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1 (1991).
14. Hummel v. State, 99 P.2d 913, 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940).
15. Oklahoma City v. Page, 6 P.2d 1033, 1034 (Okla. 1931); City of Holdenville v. Kiser, 156
P.2d 363, 365 (Okla. 1945).
16. Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 266 P. 775 (Okla. 1928).
17. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 585 (4th ed. 1971);
see also RESTATENMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
1994]
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land owned by a large number of persons. 18 There must be some in-
terference with a public right. In these jurisdictions, therefore, the
pollution of a stream that merely deprives fifty or a hundred lower
riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes connected with
their land does not, for that reason alone, become a public nuisance.19
Professor Prosser identifies Oklahoma as one of three states
which has departed from this general rule.20 In Oklahoma, a public
nuisance is statutorily defined as a nuisance "[w]hich affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted upon the individuals may be unequal.' '21 This suggests that
the Oklahoma statute defines a public nuisance to include interfer-
ence with any considerable number of persons and that no public right
need be involved. Therefore, in Oklahoma, if enough downstream ri-
parian owners which form a community, neighborhood or considera-
ble number of persons are adversely affected by a polluted stream, a
claim for public nuisance exists, even though no public right as such is
involved.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court seems to affirm Professor Pros-
ser's notion in Reaves v. Territory.23 In declaring a disorderly and dis-
reputable theater in the city of Guthrie to be a public nuisance, the
court stated that "[t]he difference between a public nuisance and a
private nuisance is that one affects the people at large, and the other
simply the individual." 4 It is certain in Oklahoma that the nuisance
or wrong does not have to affect the government or the entire commu-
nity of the state to be a public nuisance.25
There are Oklahoma cases which suggest that an activity which
affects a public interest is a public nuisance.26 However, even these
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1977).
19. Id. § 821B.
20. WILLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §88, at 585 (4th ed. 1971).
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 2 (1991).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977). while the Restatement does not
specifically refer to Oklahoma, it does provide that, in jurisdictions with statutes like Oklahoma,
such downstream riparian owners have a suit for a public nuisance despite the lack of injury to
the public interest.
23. 74 P. 951, 953 (Okla. 1903).
24. Id. (quoting In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 592 (1895)).
25. Finkelstein v. City of Sapulpa, 234 P. 187 (Okla. 1925).
26. Mackey v. Oklahoma ex rel. Harris, 495 P.2d 105, 108 (Okla. 1972); City of McAlester v.
Grand Union Tea Co., 98 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1940).
[Vol. 30:355
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cases find that the nuisance must affect a community of people in or-
der to be a public nuisance. In State ex rel. Field v. Hess,2zethe state
sought to enjoin the operation of an adult bookstore as a public nui-
sance.2 While finding that a public interest was involved, the court
necessarily determined that the activity adversely affected a commu-
nity of people.29 Thus, in Oklahoma, even if a nuisance affects a pub-
lic right, a claim for public nuisance exists only if the activity affects a
considerable number of people.
The Oklahoma statute defining public nuisance requires that in
order to be a common or public nuisance, the activity must affect the
community of people "at the same time."3 An interesting case which
considered this aspect of the definition is City of McAlester v. Grant
Union Tea Co.3 The city of McAlester enacted an ordinance which
declared door-to-door salesmen entering upon private residences
without the invitation of the private owner to be a public nuisance.32
In determining that the ordinance was beyond the power of the city to
enact, the court found that the activity was not a public nuisance be-
cause the solicitor "can only be at one place at one time and such a
call cannot reasonably be said to disturb at the same time an entire
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of per-
sons."33 Accordingly, the act, or failure to act, which constitutes the
nuisance must itself affect a community of people. It cannot be a se-
ries of like acts.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AuTHORrrY TO DECLARE CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
TO BE PUBLIC NuisANcEs
The legislature, in the exercise of its police power, has the author-
ity to declare certain uses of property or certain conduct to be public
27. 540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975).
28. Ma at 1170.
29. Id.
Continued life beyond sale, tendency to reach the impressionable young and reason-
able capability of encouraging or causing anti-social behavior especially in its impact on
young people, sets forth a public interest and affect. The nuisance already determined
in this opinion is one affecting at the same time an entire community or neighborhood,
or a considerable number of persons, though the extent upon individuals may be une-
qual. We find here a public nuisance under 50 O.S. 1971 § 2.
30. OxLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 2 (1991).
31. 98 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1940).
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nuisances and to provide for their suppression.34 In doing so, the leg-
islature has broad discretion.35 In general, the legislature may declare
anything to be a nuisance which is detrimental to the health, morals,
peace or general welfare of its citizens.36 The suppression of public
nuisances to protect the public health and morality has been described
as one of the most important duties of government.37
Again, in Oklahoma, the legislature has generally defined a pub-
lic nuisance as any nuisance which affects an entire community, neigh-
borhood or considerable number of persons.38 In addition, the
Oklahoma legislature has identified a number of specific activities as
public nuisances per se.39 These legislatively identified public nui-
sances represent an interesting assortment of diverse and dissimilar
activities.
The power of the legislature to regulate public nuisances can be
delegated to state agencies or municipalities.4" The Oklahoma legisla-
ture has so delegated its authority in several instances. For example,
34. See FRANcis H. BOHLEN & FOWLER V. HARPER, TORTS § 189, at 388 (1933); 58 AM.
JUR. 2D Nuisances § 50 & n.54 (1989) (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)).
35. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 51 (1989).
36. FRANas H. BOHLEN & FOWLER V. HARPER, TORTS § 189, at 388 (1933); 58 AM. JUR.
2 D Nuisances § 51 & n.54 (1989) (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)).
37. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 50 (1989) (citing Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163 (1842)).
38. OaA. STAT. tit. 50, § 2 (1991).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 499.10 (1991) (failure to comply with the Dog & Cat Sterilization
Act regarding pets adopted from agencies); OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 507 (1991) (failure of an animal
shelter to comply with Oklahoma's euthanasia laws); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-111 (1991) (main-
tenance of certain weeds and trash); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-112 (1991) (dilapidated buildings);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 946 (1991) (maintenance of a gambling house); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 972
(1991) (slot machine or punch-board gambling); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1052 (1991) (lotteries);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1204 (1991) (maintenance of dump yards near highways); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1225 (1991) (maintenance of a slaughterhouse in unauthorized areas); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1247 (1991) (smoking in certain public areas); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 102 (1991) (maintenance
of hazardous conditions at airports); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 995.15 (1991) (operation of bingo
halls contrary to statutory requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-206 (1991) (maintenance of
unauthorized traffic signs); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 43 (1991) (maintenance of cemetery in unau-
thorized areas); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 4 (1991) (maintenance of dogs which attack or disturb
livestock); OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 1-1011 (1991) (maintenance of filth or other conditions condu-
cive to the breeding of insects or rodents that might contribute to the spreading of diseases or
other conditions adverse to the public health); OKLIA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-818.7 (1991) (mainte-
nance of a group home for handicapped or disabled persons not in compliance with statutory
requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-1020 to 1-1021 (1991) (maintenance of a public bath not
in compliance with statutory requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1105 (1991) (maintenance
of unsafe or unsound foodstuffs); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1940 (1991) (maintenance of a nursing
home not in compliance with statutory requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2012 (1991) (main-
tenance of a junkyard not in compliance with statutory requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 69,
§§ 1252, 1258 (1991) (improper maintenance of an industrial waste facility); OKLA. STAT. tit. 69,
§ 1280 (1991) (billboard advertising not in compliance with statutory requirements); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, § 152.8 (1991) (transportation of oil or gas contrary to statutory requirements); and
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 926.4 (1991) (pollution of waters of the State).
40. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 50, 354 (1989).
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the Oklahoma legislature has expressly granted cities and towns the
power to determine what activities constitute public nuisances within
their corporate limits and to abate such nuisances.41 Similarly, the leg-
islature has expressly empowered the Scenic River Commission to
identify and abate certain public nuisances affecting state rivers.42
The legislature has also expressly empowered the State Commissioner
of Health to identify and abate public nuisances inimical to public
health.43
Of course, the power of the legislature or its delegees to declare
certain activities to be public nuisances is not without limits. It is sub-
ject to constitutional limitations.44 For example, the power to regulate
public nuisances is subject to the constitutional limitation against un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious governmental action. 5 Similarly,
the legislature cannot extend or enlarge its constitutional power over
property under the guise of regulating nuisances.46 Moreover, with
regard to the termination of pre-existing activities thereafter declared
by the legislature to be public nuisances, due process requirements of
notice and opportunity for hearing must be satisfied.47
The legislature or its delegees cannot lawfully declare something
to be a nuisance if it in fact is not.48 The court illustrates this point in
McAlester, wherein the city of McAlester tried to declare uninvited
door-to-door solicitation a public nuisance.49 The court held that, at
most, specific incidents of door-to-door solicitation could constitute
separate and unrelated instances of private trespass or private nui-
sance, but in no event did the activity constitute a public nuisance.5"
Therefore, the court invalidated the city ordinance stating "the munic-
ipality cannot successfully declare that to be a nuisance which plainly
is not."51
41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-121 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 16 (1991). See also Whitson
v. City of Ada, 44 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1935).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1461 (1991).
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-106, 1-204 (1991).
44. 58 Am. JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 55, 56 & n.94 (1989) (citing Vance v. Universal Amuse-
ment Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), reh'g. denied, 446 U.S. 947 (1980)).
45. l § 55 & n.94 (citing CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Co., 118 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1974)).
46. Id. §§ 55 & n.95, 56 & n.11 (citing Ghaster Properties Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552
(Ohio 1962), transferred to 194 N.E.2d 158, rev'd on other grounds, 200 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1964));
State ex rel. Wausau S.R. Co. v. Bancroft, 134 N.W. 330 (Wis. 1912).
47. CEEED, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
48. Id. (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)).
49. City of McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co., 98 P.2d 924, 925 (Okla. 1940).
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V. MIXED NUISANCES IN OKLAHOMA
Public and private nuisance laws are often overlapping and inter-
related. In many jurisdictions they are not mutually exclusive ap-
proaches to a nuisance factual situation.52 In these jurisdictions, a
nuisance may be both public and private in character.5 3 Such nui-
sances are referred to as mixed nuisances.54 In these jurisdictions, a
nuisance which affects a considerable number of people or a public
interest and which also produces special injury to private rights may
be the subject of both a public nuisance and private nuisance claim.55
Oklahoma follows the general rule. The Oklahoma nuisance stat-
ute declares that every nuisance not included in the definition of a
public nuisance is a private nuisance.56 The statute suggests that a
public nuisance can be a private nuisance if it is specially injurious to
private interests, but that a purely private nuisance cannot become a
public nuisance. The Oklahoma courts have found mixed nuisances
on occasion.5 7 Thus, in Oklahoma, if an individual suffers special in-
jury from a public nuisance, he may proceed on claims for both a pub-
lic and private nuisance.
VI. PRIVATE RIGHT TO SUE FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE
In order for a private person to bring a claim for public nuisance
in Oklahoma, that person must have standing to sue.5 8 A person has
standing to sue if the public nuisance is "specially injurious" to him,
but not otherwise.59 The purpose for requiring special injury is to
avoid the burden on both the courts and defendants wrought by a
52. Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 917
(Ariz. 1985).
53. Id.
54. Riggins v. District Ct. of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645, 662 (Utah 1935).
55. State ex reL Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 3 (1991).
57. Jordan v. Luippold, 114 P.2d 917,919 (Okla. 1941). Suit was brought by adjoining land-
owner against the owner of a dilapidated property that was breeding ground for rats, among
other things. Id. at 918. The Court determined that the condition was "a hazard to the health of
the community" and also allowed a claim for private nuisance. Id
58. Ruminer v. Quanilty, 179 P.2d 164 (Okla. 1947).
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 10 (1991).
(Vol. 30:355
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multiplicity of suits for a nuisance which affects a community of indi-
viduals.60 Special injury has been defined as an injury which is differ-
ent in kind, not merely degree, from that suffered by the general
public. 61 The standing rule has been easier to state than to apply.
What kind of injury is special or different in kind, and not merely
degree? A fruitful line of cases which considers this question and pro-
vides some answers involves obstruction of public roads.6' In McKay
v. City of Enid,63 the plaintiff owned land near the City of Enid.'
There were three public roads which afforded access to his land from
the city.65 The city authorized a railroad company to construct a rail-
way which obstructed two of the roads.6 6 The plaintiff brought suit on
a public nuisance theory.67 The court determined that the plaintiff did
not suffer special injury and, therefore, had no standing to sue.6 8 He
may have been inconvenienced, but his injury was unlike the other
people who exercised the right of passage.69 The court compared the
plaintiff's injury, not to the public in general, but to the people who
actually exercised the right which was interfered with, that is, the right
to use the obstructed road.70
Injury is suffered which is different in kind from those who actu-
ally exercise the right of passage on a public road if the individual's
land abuts an obstructed public road and access to the land is entirely
cut off71 or materially interrupted. 72 In these cases, the abutting land-
owner has standing to sue to abate a public nuisance. Thus, in order
to bring an action for public nuisance, the individual plaintiff must
establish some injury materially different from the injury suffered by
the public in general.
60. W ILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 587 (4th ed. 1971).
61. Schlirf v. Loosen, 232 P.2d 928, 930 (Okla. 1951).
62. McKay v. City of Enid, 109 P. 520 (Okla. 1910); Revard v. Hunt, 119 P. 589 (Okla.
1911); Liggett v. Peck, 168 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1946).
63. 109 P. 520 (Okla. 1910).
64. Id. at 521.
65. 1&. at 520.
66. Id
67. Id at 521.
68. Id at 523.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Revard v. Hunt, 119 P. 589 (Okla. 1911).
72. Ligget v. Peck, 168 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1946); Thomas v. Farrier, 65 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1937);
Mackey v. Aycock, 201 P. 365 (Okla. 1921).
1994]
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Once the threshold standing issue has been satisfied, the private
citizen may sue on a public nuisance theory. In such a case, the Plain-
tiff invokes the public right and sues to protect the public right.73 The
individual stands in the shoes of the public prosecutor with all the
rights, benefits and limitations of the public prosecutor. 74 Presuma-
bly, the private plaintiff bringing a public nuisance claim thereby in-
herits all the rights and limitations imposed upon the public
prosecutor.
VII. PUBLIC NuIsANce. REMEDIES
Public nuisances have historically been treated as crimes against
the state, therefore, the remedies against public nuisances generally
reside with governmental authorities and officials.7 This is the case in
Oklahoma.76 According to Oklahoma law, "[a] public nuisance may
be abated by any public body or officer authorized thereto by law."'77
Other statutes authorize specific governmental officials, such as the
Attorney General and the district attorneys to suppress the mainte-
nance of public nuisances.78
In Oklahoma, the available remedies for public nuisance include:
1) An indictment or information; 2) A civil action; or 3) An abate-
ment.79 Thus, where a public nuisance exists, the appropriate govern-
mental official can cause the nuisance to be abated by the state, the
official can bring a civil action for abatement and/or damages against
the person maintaining the public nuisance, the official can bring a
criminal proceeding against the person maintaining the public nui-
sance, or the official can seek all three remedies.80 It has been ob-
served that the penal aspect of creating or maintaining a public
73. Ruminer v. Quanilty, 179 P.2d 164 (Okla. 1947).
74. Revard, 119 P. at 593.
75. See 3 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 35.02 (Rev. ed. 1990)
("[A] public nuisance... is an invasion of a right common to members of the public gener-
ally... It is an offense against the state.... It is a crime."); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 259
(1989) ("[A] public nuisance is generally redressed by an action or proceeding in the name of the
state, or at the suit of some proper officer or body as its authorized representative.").
76. OK"A. STAT. tit. 21, § 1191 (1991) provides: "Any person who maintains or commits
any public nuisance, the punishment for which is not otherwise prescribed, or who willfully omits
to perform any legal duty relating to the removal of a public nuisance, is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 11 (1991).
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 507 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1397 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§§ 1-106, 1-204 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 926.10, 1461 (1991).
79. OrLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 8 (1991).
80. The fact that abatement is accomplished does not preclude an action to recover dam-
ages for the past existence of the nuisance. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 6 (1991). Similarly, the fact
[Vol. 30:355
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nuisance is only incidental to the state's main objective of preventing
continuing threats to the public health and safety.8'
Where the remedy of indictment or information is sought, the
proceeding is treated as any other criminal proceeding.' Abatement,
on the other hand, can occur as the result of self help by the state or as
the result of a judicial proceeding seeking injunctive relief.8 3 How-
ever, abatement always refers to the abatement of the nuisance, not
the damages caused by the nuisance and care should be taken not to
confuse the two. "A nuisance should be called a 'nuisance' instead of
'damage'. 'Injury' is often used in a lay sense as meaning 'damage'
but in a legal sense it means 'wrong'. Injury is a wrong, and damage is
the result."'  The damages sustained as a result of a public nuisance
must be recovered through a civil action. Often a party will refer to
the injury suffered as though the injury itself is the nuisance. How-
ever, as explained above, the nuisance is the thing which causes the
injury, not the injury that results therefrom.
Because public nuisances have traditionally been considered of-
fenses against the state, i.e., crimes, claims regarding public nuisances
were originally governed by concepts of criminal law, not tort law.85
However, many jurisdictions recognize that a public nuisance may
also constitute a tort where the nuisance causes harm to an individual
of a kind different in character from that suffered by the public in
general.86 Oklahoma has recognized the tort of public nuisance.87
Thus, where a public nuisance causes special injuries to an individual,
in addition to the injuries suffered by the public in general, the public
nuisance is both a crime against the state and a tort against the
individual.
that criminal prosecution is sought does not preclude abatement by injunctive relief. See Mc-
Nulty v. State, 217 P. 467 (Okla. 1923).
81. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Public Nuisance; A Crime in Tort Law, 318 OKLA. L. REv.
318, 322 (1978) (citing Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson Excavation and Wrecking Co., 241
N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976)).
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 9 (1991).
83. Id. §§ 8, 11; Simons v. Falmestock, 78 P.2d 388 (Okla. 1938).
84. Oklahoma City v. Page, 6 P.2d 1033,1036 (Okla. 1931) (noting that misuse of the terms
"nuisance" and "damage" has caused confusion difficult to unscramble).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1977).
86. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AT-, THm LAW OF TORTS § 1.23, at 77 (2nd ed. 1986) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1977)); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 645 & n.33 (5th ed. 1984) ("[n]o case has been found of
tort liability for a public nuisance which was not a crime.").
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 10 (1991) provides: "A private person may maintain an action for
public nuisance if it is specially injurious to him but not otherwise."
1994]
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Where an individual sustains special injuries as a result of a public
nuisance, his remedies are a civil action, abatement, or both.8 How-
ever his remedies are strictly limited to the extent of his special inju-
ries.8 9 The individual cannot also recover for the injuries to the
general public in his private tort action.' Thus, in abating a public
nuisance, an individual may only abate the nuisance to the extent it is
specially injurious to him.91 For example, if an obstruction on a public
highway impairs an individual's access to his own land, he can only
remove as much of the obstruction as is necessary to permit him to
have access to his land.' He cannot go further under the auspices of
enforcing the public's right to completely remove the obstruction and,
if he does, he runs the risk of personal liability.93
There has long been recognized the tort of private nuisance. It
has been said that an individual's rights under a private nuisance claim
are the same as under a public nuisance claim.94 Indeed, other than
88. l § 10 (providing for a civil action); id. § 12 (providing for abatement, the statute
states: "[a]ny person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him, by remov-
ing or, if necessary, destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a
breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury.").
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1977).
90. Id. Professors Keeton and Prosser provide: "Redress of the wrong to the community
must be left to its appointed representatives. The best reason that has been given for the rule is
that it relieves the defendant of the multiplicity of actions which might follow if everyone were
free to sue for the common harm." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §90, at 646 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser and Keeton note that there has been "some
agitation for abolition of the rule" in connection with environmental matters. Id. at 646-47.
However, they state that on the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary, "[n]o case
has been found in which a private individual has been held to have standing to sue for a public
nuisance" to enforce the public's rights. Id.
In Garland Grain Co. v. D-C Home Owners Improvement Ass'n, 393 S.W.2d 635, 639-40
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) the court stated:
The state is not a party to this suit. Even though the pollution of a public stream is
made unlawful ... the duty of prohibiting pollution of public waters is vested exclu-
sively in the state. Though a nuisance may be public, it furnishes an individual no right
of action, unless he has in some way been actually injured or will suffer such an injury
by its maintenance. No one can constitute himself a guardian of the public and main-
tain an action for public nuisance which does not sensibly injure him or his property,
although he be a member of the community where such nuisance exists. The rights of
the general public are not involved unless the state-the custodian of those rights-is
made a party to the suit.
In Oklahoma, the state has jurisdiction over pollution of public waters. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A,
§ 2-6-103 (1993).
91. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 605
(4th ed. 1971); see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.18, at 59 & n.17 (2d
ed. 1986).
92. FOWLER V. HARPER ST AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.18, at 59 & n.17 (2d ed. 1986).
93. Id.
94. FANCis H. BOHLEN & FOWLER V. HARPER, TORTS § 179, at 371-72 (1933) ("a public
nuisance is not actionable by an individual unless and until it becomes, as to him, a private
12
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the remedy of criminal prosecution, the remedies for private nui-
sances in Oklahoma are the same as for public nuisances." Why then,
is there a need for both the torts of public and private nuisance? The
reason is that, historically, a private nuisance was "an invasion, usually
non-trespassory, of the private use and enjoyment of land. '96 Thus,
even though personal injuries could be recovered, in addition to the
damages to the land once the private nuisance was shown to exist, the
underlying action was grounded strictly upon the interference with the
use and enjoyment of land.
Unlike the tort of private nuisance, the tort of public nuisance
need not be grounded (although it may) upon interference with one's
use and enjoyment of private land.97 For example, an obstruction to a
public highway, i.e., a public nuisance, may cause an individual to
have a collision resulting in personal injuries. In such instance, the
individual has sustained injuries different in kind from those sustained
by the public and could therefore maintain an action for public nui-
sance. However, because the injuries do not relate to the individual's
use or enjoyment of his land, at common law an action for private
nuisance would not lie.98
VIII. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC NUISANCES
The majority rule is that, in the absence of joint or concurrent
conduct or community of action, there is no joint liability for separate
and independent actions which contribute to the creation or mainte-
nance of a public nuisance.99 Thus, if separate and independent indus-
tries discharge pollutants into a stream or river, under the majority
nuisance, i.e., until he suffers some special and definite harm therefrom.") (quoting Davis v.
Spragg, 79 S.E. 652 (W. Va. 1913)).
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 13 (1991).
96. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL-, THE LAW OF TORTs § 1.23, at 76 (2d ed. 1986) (citing
RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977)); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 572 (4th ed. 1971); Mandell v. Pivnick, 125 A.2d 175,
176 (Conn. 1956). It is noted, however, that Oklahoma's definition of private nuisance may have
deviated from the historical concept of private nuisance. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 1-3 (1991).
97. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
98. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.23, at 78 (2d ed. 1986) (citing
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. d (1977)); Beckwith v. Stratford, 29 A.2d 775
(Conn. 1942); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
99. 66 CJ.S. Nuisance § 89 & n.43 (1950) (citing Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 247 N.W, 572
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rule each would be severally liable only for its proportionate share of
the damages.3 °
Some states, including Oklahoma, do not adhere to the majority
rule.10 1 The minority rule, as applied in Oklahoma, holds that
"[w]hen, although, concert is lacking, the separate and independent
acts of several combine to produce directly a nuisance and resulting
injury, each is responsible for the entire result, even though the sepa-
rate acti of the parties might not have caused the result."" 2 The
Oklahoma cases make it clear, however, that the independent acts
must combine to produce a single injury.10 3 Thus, if an industrial user
discharges pollutants into a public river, and a different industrial user
discharges pollutants into the air, there is no single injury which gives
rise to joint liability even though a common piece of land may be af-
fected thereby.
When dealing with joint and several liability, the question arises
as to whether successive owners of property are jointly and severally
liable in Oklahoma for a public nuisance. The statute addressing this
issue states: "[e]very successive owner of property who neglects to
abate a continuing nuisance upon, or in the use of such property cre-
ated by a former owner, is liable therefore in the same manner as the
one who first created it."'' In considering the effect of this provision
on the liability of a successor owner for a pre-existing nuisance on the
land, the Oklahoma courts have held that a purchaser of land cannot
be held liable for damages occasioned by the nuisance until his atten-
tion has been called to it and he has been asked to abate it.'0 The
rule is different where the purchaser uses or repairs the nuisance. In
such an instance, the requirement of notice is waived and the pur-
chaser may be held liable for the nuisance, just as the creator of it may
be held liable.' 6
The Idaho Supreme Court, in considering that state's identical
statutory provision, considered the contention "that under this statute
a man who purchases property containing a nuisance is liable for the
100. Il § 89 & n.,5 (citing Ralston v. United Verde Copper Co., 37 F.2d 180 (D. Ariz. 1929),
affd, 46 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1931)).
101. Id. § 89 & nn.49-52 (citing West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 72 N.E. 879 (Ind.
1904); Cook v. City of DuQuoin, 256 Ill. App. 452 (1930)).
102. Oklahoma City v. 1yetenicz, 52 P.2d 849,850 (Okla. 1935), overruled on other grounds,
61 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1936); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff, 122 P.2d 1020, 1023
(Okla.. 1942); Northup v. Eakes, 178 P. 266, 268 (Okla. 1918).
103. Northup, 178 P. at 268.
104. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 5 (1991).
105. Daniels v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 128 P. 1089, 1090 (Okla. 1912).
106. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Morton, 157 P. 917, 920 (Okla. 1916).
[Vol. 30:355
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damage previously inflicted by that nuisance."'01 7 The court held that
the statute did not impose liability.'08 Thus, the purpose of the statute
is to insure that liability for the nuisance cannot be defeated merely
by conveying the land to a new owner. 0 9
If the nuisance results from the manner in which an operation is
conducted and is not a nuisance per se, the nuisance cannot continue
after sale of the property without action by the purchaser.110 In such
an instance, the acts of the former owner and the purchaser have not
combined to result in a single harm, but rather their acts are succes-
sive."' Therefore, a former owner of property and its current owner
are not jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from the
nuisance.1 2
In order to require a party to abate a nuisance, he must have a
legal right and be under a legal duty to terminate the cause of in-
jury.113 The obligation to abate a nuisance can only be imposed upon
a person who has exclusive control over the property where the nui-
sance is located." 4 Once the conveyance of the land is complete and
the former owner has conveyed his right of exclusive occupancy of the
land, he has no such right or duty." 5 Thus, there is no cause of action
to abate a nuisance against a former owner who conveyed to another
exclusive control over the land which contains the nuisance." 6
107. Brose v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 133 P. 673, 676 (Idaho 1913).
108. d The Court went on to describe the purpose of the statutory provision in the follow-
ing terms:
It was enacted for the purpose of rendering the purchaser of a property that contains a
nuisance liable to an action to abate the nuisance in the same manner as if he had
created the nuisance.... In other words, it was intended to preclude the purchaser of
property containing a nuisance defending against an action for damages or to abate the
same, on the ground that he did not create the nuisance, and that he was not responsi-
ble for its creation.
Id.
109. Pierce v. German Say. & Loan Soc'y, 13 P. 478 (Cal. 1887); Ahem v. Steele, 22 N.E. 193
(N.Y. 1889); Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Yale Oil Corp., 169 P.2d 732 (Mont. 1946).
110. Midland Empire, 169 P.2d at 735.
Il. l.
112. Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 385 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1989);
New York Telephone Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1984); State of New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2nd Cir. 1985); RESTATEmE-NT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 351-54 (1977).
113. Vana v. Grain Belt Supply Co., 18 N.W.2d 669 (Neb. 1945); Keener v. Addis, 5 S.E.2d
695 (Ga. 1940).
114. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1051.
115. Midland Empire, 169 P.2d at 736.
116. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1051.
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IX. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Oklahoma, the Statute of Limitations for torts is two years. 17
This includes the tort of nuisance." 8 However, the statutes provide
that "[n]o lapse of time can legalize a public nuisance amounting to an
actual obstruction of a public right." 119 At common law, the right to
maintain a nuisance could be acquired by prescription, laches, or an-
other time-based legal theory. 2 The Tenth Circuit, addressing
Oklahoma law, recognized that the right to pollute a stream and sus-
tain a nuisance could be acquired by way of prescription.21
Oklahoma codifies the common law rule that the right to main-
tain a public nuisance cannot be acquired by prescription or other
time-based legal theory." In Revard v, Hunt,"3 wherein the court
construed this statute, the court determined that "[f]rom this statute,
as well as the common law, it is clear no lapse of time can either legal-
ize a public nuisance, nor can any right or title be acquired by pre-
scription to permit or continue the same." 124 Thus, the statute
addresses the right of the public authority or a private individual, who
through special injury, gains standing to maintain an action to protect
public rights to abate the nuisance no matter how long the nuisance
has been in existence. The right to continue a public nuisance cannot
be acquired by prescription or other time-based legal theory.- 5
Federal Courts in Oklahoma appear to be split on the issue of
whether the two year statute applies to a private individual claiming
money damages resulting from a public nuisance. One has held that
there is no statute of limitations for a private claim for money dam-
ages resulting from a public nuisance 126 and another has held that the
two year statute of limitations applies.' 2 7 However, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has never rendered such a holding, therefore, this
seems to be an open question. Any Oklahoma Court reviewing this
question should consider that Oklahoma's statute 28 is derived from
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 (1991).
118. Haenchen v. Sand Products Co., 626 P.2d 332, 334 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
119. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 7 (1991).
120. 5 R. PowELL & P. ROHAR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 'I 704[3][d][ii] (1990).
121. United States v. Fixico, 115 F.2d 389, 392 (10th Cir. 1940).
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 7 (1991).
123. 119 P. 589 (Okla. 1911).
124. l at 592.
125. Lindauer v. Hill, 262 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Okla. 1953).
126. Darnron v. Apache, No. 92-C-6431 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 1993).
127. Branch v. Mobil, No. 91-C-7621 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 1991).
128. OdA. STAT. tit. 50, § 7 (1991).
[Vol. 30:355
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the laws of North Dakota.12 9 North Dakota, in turn, borrowed from
California. 3 ' In fact, Idaho, 3' North Dakota, 32 South Dakota, 33
and California13 all have codified provisions identical to Oklahoma.
The Courts in these states, like Oklahoma, have affirmed that the sec-
tion is intended to insure that the right to maintain a public nuisance
cannot be acquired by prescription. 35 Nearly 100 years after codifica-
tion of the provision, the Supreme Courts of these states have yet to
hold that there is no statute of limitations for a private claim for
money damages resulting from a public nuisance. The Oklahoma
Courts should also consider the historical framework under which the
tort of public nuisance developed. A private individual brings an ac-
tion on a public nuisance in order to protect the public rights.'36 In
this regard the private individual bringing a public nuisance claim re-
tains all the restrictions of the public prosecutor. The public prosecu-
tor cannot bring a claim for money damages to private property for a
public nuisance.'3  Likewise, when a private individual brings a claim
for money damages resulting from a public nuisance, the rules for de-
termining money damages in a private nuisance action are employed.
In this framework, it would seem that the private claimant requesting
money damages in the context of the public nuisance claim cannot
avoid the statute of limitations which is otherwise applicable to the
private nuisance claim.
X. LEGISLATIVE PERMISSION TO CoNDuCr WHAT MIGHT
OTHERWISE CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC NUISANCE
"Just as the legislature, within its constitutional limitations...
may declare particular conduct to be a nuisance, it may authorize that
which would otherwise be a nuisance."' 38 Some states have laws
which provide that nothing which is done or maintained under express
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-13 (1983).
130. CAL CIv. CODE § 3483 (West 1993).
131. IDAHO CODE §52.109 (1994).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-13 (1983).
133. S.D. CODnED LAWS ANN. § 21-10-8 (1987).
134. CAL CiV. CODE § 3483 (West 1993).
135. City of Lewiston v. Booth, 34 P. 809, 811 (Idaho 1893); Livingston v. Kodiac Packing
Co., 37 P. 149 (Cal. 1894).
136. Phillips v. Altman, 412 P.2d 199, 201 (Okla. 1966).
137. RESTATENMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821C (1977).
138. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 91, at 606 (4th ed. 1971).
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authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance. 39 Oklahoma has
such a statute. 140 In addressing these statutes it has been said:
[a]s a rule, the courts will not hold conduct to constitute a nuisance
where authority for such conduct exists by virtue of legislative en-
actment. When the legislature directs or allows that to be done
which would otherwise be a nuisance, it will be valid on the ground
that the legislature is ordinarily the proper judge of what the public
good requires .... 141
Thus, where the legislature expressly authorizes an activity, con-
ducting such activity cannot constitute a public nuisance. State and
federal regulations often authorize the conducting of certain industrial
activities if conducted in a specified manner. 42 Often a permit must
be obtained from a regulatory agency before the activity can be com-
menced. For example, Oklahoma and many other states strictly regu-
late air emissions from hydrogen sulfide gas processing
("sweetening") plants and require that a permit for all such facilities
be obtained from the State. 43 Where such a gas sweetening plant is
operated in accordance with the state-issued permit, in no event can
the permitted air emissions constitute a public nuisance. 44
139. See Rebelo v. Cardoso, 161 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1960); Borough of Collegeville v. Philadel-
phia Suburban Water Co., 105 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1954); Messer v. City of Dickinson, 3 N.W.2d 241
(N.D. 1942).
140. OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4 (1991) ("[N]othing which is done or maintained under the ex-
press authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance"). See also McKay v. City of Enid, 109 P.
520 (Okla. 1910) (authorization by the State to conduct a particular business or industry relieves
the company "from liability to suit, civil or criminal, at the instance of the government").
141. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 463 (1989).
The legislature generally may legalize, insofar as the public is concerned, what would
otherwise be a public nuisance... and within constitutional limitations it may make
lawful things that were nuisances, even though by doing so, the use or value of the
property is affected. Where the doing of a thing that would otherwise be a public nui-
sance is authorized by legislative authority, the doing of that thing by the person so
authorized in the manner authorized cannot constitute a public nuisance. The legisla-
tive authority is a complete protection against accountability for a public nuisance from
the mere doing of the act, and exempts the person doing it from civil or criminal liabil-
ity therefor at the suit of the State.
Id § 464 (citing State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1976));
Middelkamp v. Ressemer Irrigating Ditch Co., 103 P. 280 (Colo. 1909); Urie v. Franconia Paper
Corp., 218 A.2d 360 (N.H. 1966). Other authorities are in accord. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.29, at 117 (2d ed. 1986) ("[t]he legislature may and often does authorize
an activity. Such legislative authorization will (if exercised within constitutional bounds) prevent
the activity from being a public nuisance provided it is carried on within the limits of the authori-
zation" ) (quoting Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914)); Robinson Brick
Co. v. Luthi, 169 P.2d 171 (Colo. 1946).
142. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-1601, 1-2300 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 301 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Oklahoma Clean Air Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1801 (1991).
144. OKA.A. STAT. tit. 50, § 4 (1991); 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 17 (1950).
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In order for legislative authority to be a valid defense to a public
nuisance claim, the activity must be conducted in accordance with the
legislative authority. 45 The defense is lost if the authority is not com-
plied with or is exceeded.' 46 Also, if the legislative authority pertains
only to certain aspects of the activity, and not to others, compliance
with the statutes will not be a defense to a public nuisance claim as to
the non-regulated or unauthorized aspects of the activity. 147 For ex-
ample, if the State regulations do not authorize the specific location,
the authorized activity may still constitute a public nuisance if located
at a place injurious to others."4 Similarly, if the legislative authority
does not specify the exact method of operation, operation of the activ-
ity in an unreasonable or offensive manner may still constitute a pub-
lic nuisance. Stated differently, the regulated aspect of the activity
must cover the same aspect which is alleged to constitute the public
nuisance. Thus, the fact that a building is constructed in accordance
with all existing statutes and codes does not thereafter preclude the
building from constituting a public nuisance if it is later used as a gam-
bling house' 50
XI. CONCLUSION
Increasing efforts are being made today to apply the law of public
nuisance to new types of private claims for money damages which
were not traditionally associated with claims for public nuisance. In
assessing the appropriateness of applying the law of public nuisance to
such new claims, one must understand the history of the law of public
nuisance as it has evolved through the common law. Originally, public
nuisance was to address wrongs against the crown, i.e. the governmen-
tal body.15 1 Although the doctrine of public nuisance was later ex-
tended to private claims by individuals, it was so extended only in
145. 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 17 (1950).
146. 58 Am. JuR. 2D Nuisances § 463 (1989) (citing Messer v. City of Dickinson, 3 N.W.2d
241 (N.D. 1942)).
147. 66 CJ.S. Nuisance § 17 (1950).
148. 58 AM. JuR. 2D Nuisance § 463 (2d ed. 1989) (citing People v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 151 N.Y.S. 547 (1915), affd, 110 N.E. 1046 (N.Y. 1915); Rosenheimer v. Standard Gaslight
Co., 55 N.Y.S. 192 (1898)).
149. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRms § 1.29, at 119 (2d ed. 1986) (citing
Christopher v. Jones, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1964); Nair v. Thaw, 242 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1968); O'Neill
v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 244 A.2d 372 (Conn. 1968)).
150. See, e.g., Bakersfield v. Miller, 410 P.2d 393 (Cal. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988
(1966); Knapp v. Newport Beach, 9 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1960).
151. WVLLIAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 572 (4th ed. 1971).
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those limited cases where the individual experienced injuries as a re-
sult of an interference or obstruction of a public right and the individ-
ual had no other cause of action available to redress such injuries.15 2
It was never intended to give the individual yet another cause of ac-
tion where another more traditional cause of action such as negli-
gence, trespass or private nuisance was already available. Nor was it
intended to give the individual special damages or protection over and
above what was available under these more traditional causes of ac-
tion. Because of this, efforts to make wholesale application of the law
of public nuisance to new types of private claims for money damages
should be seriously considered within the developmental framework
out of which the tort of public nuisance arose.
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 821B (1977).
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